Syria, a Success and a Catastrophe

The Scenario — The Kurds in the North, Iran and Russia that have certainly not abandoned their interests in the area, and the cumbersome American presence: the delicate balance between groups known to the CIA, who have now changed their names.

by Pino Arlacchi

The swift collapse of Assad’s regime has delivered a tactical victory to Turkey and the United States, one that might evolve into a complex strategic puzzle. The United States now faces the risk of a “catastrophic success” — a scenario that loomed ten years ago but never materialized due to Russia and Iran’s intervention in support of Assad during the civil war. Meanwhile, Erdogan finds himself in the delicate position of managing this success without undermining the fragile regional balance achieved in recent years, particularly the new Ankara-Moscow-Tehran axis.

This strategic triangle, which has emerged in recent years as a counterweight to Western influence in the Middle East, was cemented by shared interests: a mutual opposition to American hegemony in the region, coordinated management of energy resources, and a common concern over separatist movements. Despite some tensions, this partnership has enabled the three powers to align their policies on crucial issues, from trade flows to responses against Western sanctions.

The Kurdish issue remains a persistent thorn. The collapse of the Damascus regime has created a power vacuum in northern Syria, where Kurdish forces will attempt to consolidate their autonomy — an unacceptable outcome for Ankara. However, an overly aggressive Turkish military intervention risks jeopardizing delicate relations with Russia and Iran.

Moscow and Tehran’s reluctant acceptance of the new situation in Damascus shouldn’t be misinterpreted: both nations have critical interests in Syria. Russia deems maintaining its naval presence in Tartus essential, while Iran sees Syria as a linchpin of its “Shia crescent.” Neither will passively tolerate excessive Turkish influence in the region.

Reconstruction efforts further complicate the picture. After over a decade of devastation, Syria requires colossal investments to recover. The Sunni groups who have emerged victorious with Western support lack the resources to fund rebuilding efforts. Turkey could play a central role in this process, but it must coordinate with Russia and Iran, both of whom see reconstruction as an opportunity to secure their influence in Syria.

A significant concern is the nature of the victorious factions. Branded as “moderate insurgents,” these groups are remnants of jihadist forces once supported by the CIA, Qatar, and Turkey. The most prominent faction, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is essentially Al-Nusra with a new name. Its leader carries a $10 million American bounty. Despite their declarations of tolerance, moderation, and readiness to disband, these factions maintain radical ideologies. Their loyalty to Western sponsors is just as opportunistic as that of their predecessors in Afghanistan and other regions. They aim to create an Islamic state along Israel’s border. Managing these factions without alienating the United States, Russia, and Iran will require Erdogan to deploy a concentrated dose of his signature double-dealing.

The most favorable scenario for Turkey, the West, and Russia is the actual implementation of the unanimously approved U.N. Security Council resolution, which calls for forming an inclusive government, holding elections, containing Kurdish ambitions, and maintaining regional balance. However, the road to achieving this is littered with nearly insurmountable obstacles. Victorious Kurds and Sunnis are unlikely to accept significant compromises, while Syria’s religious minorities — Alawites, Christians, and Druze — already view the new direction with apprehension.

The alternative scenario — prolonged instability — appears more likely. A patchwork of competing militias could transform Syria into a 1990s-style Afghanistan, with dire consequences for regional security. For Turkey, which shares a long border with Syria, this prospect is particularly alarming and threatens its internal stability.

Erdogan now faces critical strategic choices. He must carefully balance his influence over former terrorist factions to avoid the “catastrophic success” predicted by analysts a decade ago. The outcome of Turkey’s delicate maneuvering could determine not just Syria’s future but also the power dynamics of the entire Middle East.

In this geopolitical puzzle, Trump’s declared U.S. disengagement could potentially stabilize the situation. Reducing the number of external actors involved in Syria may simplify the strategic landscape, making new regional balances easier to achieve. Importantly, none of the key players — Turkey, Iran, Russia, or the former rebel groups — are particularly interested in maintaining a U.S. presence in the region. This convergence of interests could lead to more manageable regional dynamics based on pragmatic concerns rather than global geopolitical agendas.

Il Fatto Quotidiano, December 12, 2024