During the 1994 Budapest Summit, the debate over NATO’s potential expansion into Central Europe intensified, with Henry Kissinger and Jack Matlock offering contrasting viewpoints. President Clinton supported preparing countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for NATO membership, while Russian President Yeltsin warned that such a move could lead to a “cold peace,” suggesting it would isolate Russia and heighten tensions. Kissinger argued that expanding NATO was a necessary security measure to avoid creating a vulnerable “no-man’s land” between Russia and Germany, which could lead to renewed spheres of influence and instability. He saw NATO as an insurance policy to deter potential future threats, emphasizing that delaying expansion until Russia grew stronger would be strategically unwise.
On the other hand, Jack Matlock advised caution, emphasizing that NATO expansion could inflame Russian nationalism and undermine those advocating for democratic reforms in Russia. He believed that expansion should occur only in response to a direct threat, not preemptively. Matlock also highlighted the importance of integrating Eastern European countries into the European Union for economic stability, suggesting that NATO was sometimes viewed as a substitute for the more challenging task of EU integration. Both agreed on maintaining friendly political relations with Russia, but their disagreement lay in balancing security guarantees for Central Europe without provoking Russia unnecessarily.
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Robert MacNeil: First, tonight, the debate over expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance to several countries in Central Europe. The debate flared today at the European Security and Cooperation Summit in speeches by President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin. Since the collapse of communism in Central Europe, there have been proposals and debate over whether and how to expand NATO, which now guarantees mutual protection for 16 Western nations in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, to such countries as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Today at the so-called CSCE Summit in Budapest, President Yeltsin repeated his country’s opposition to that idea. He warned of a cold peace and said the world could not be run from one capital, a reference to Washington and the U.S. But the issue of NATO expansion has also divided American officials and analysts.
We take up the story with two of them:
- Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State,
- Jack Matlock, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, now a professor at Columbia University.
Starting with you, Ambassador Matlock, the Russians are clearly very unhappy about the prospect of expanding NATO. Let’s start with this: What is the U.S. policy right now? How quickly is the Clinton administration pushing to expand NATO from what you can read?
Jack Matlock: Well, my understanding is that their position is that the East Europeans should be prepared for NATO, and though no date has been set, that the question is not if but when.
Robert MacNeil: And NATO itself, recently, just for background here, recently voted to come up within a year with a list of sort of conditions for membership or potential members. So the issue is moving forward, as you understand it. Is that correct?
Henry Kissinger: The issue is moving forward, but we have to be careful not to trap ourselves in an endless waffle. When we say the issue is not if but when, the responsibility of national leaders is not to ask rhetorical questions but to answer them. So we have an obligation to give some sort of an answer to when, and the Russians are not unhappy about the timing. They’re unhappy about the fact. And therefore we ought to face that as early as possible.
Robert MacNeil: Well, where is the pressure, as you understand it, Jack Matlock, where is the pressure coming from for quick expansion inside NATO? We know that certain Eastern European or Central European countries, like Poland, would love to be a member quickly. But where is the pressure coming from inside NATO?
Jack Matlock: Well, my understanding is that the Germans have been sort of the principal advocates within NATO. They’re joined by certain others. I’m one who feels that while we should leave the possibility open, we should make clear that we would back expansion only if there is a threat that needs to be met. In other words, we should use it to pressure the Russians to ease off on the rhetoric and to behave in a manner that does not threaten these countries. It seems to me that that would make a better policy than making a decision now and proceeding, whatever the Russians do, to carry it out. Another problem here is that I think it’s much more important for the Poles, the Czechs, and the other East Europeans to get into the European Union. This is important economically. They need the markets. And I suspect that some Europeans look at NATO as almost a surrogate for doing what would be a more difficult matter for them, and that is opening their markets to these countries.
Robert MacNeil: Mr. Matlock does not see a need to press for expanding NATO to those countries at the moment. What do you see?
Henry Kissinger: The basic problem is as follows. The reason the Germans are interested in the expansion of NATO is that the border of NATO now is at the eastern German border, which doesn’t happen to be threatened because that’s the border with Poland. If there is a threat — and we can argue whether there is or not — it is at the Polish border with its eastern neighbors. So it is sort of senseless to have a guarantee for the borders that are not threatened and no guarantee for the borders that may be threatened. Secondly, I think it is important to define what Europe is supposed to be. If we have two categories of borders in Central Europe, we are creating, de facto, a no-man’s land between Russia and Germany, which both of them will then try to fill, encouraging nationalism in both Russia and Germany, and the sort of separate deal for the partition or spheres of influence, exactly the sort of diplomacy that contributed so much to European tensions and wars before World War II.
Robert MacNeil: Just before we get into too many issues here, let’s go back to the question of which borders are threatened and which borders are not threatened. My understanding is that no borders are threatened at the moment. Even the existing borders of NATO are not threatened at the moment.
Henry Kissinger: The existing borders of NATO can’t be threatened because they are now adjoining friendly countries. So, there’s nobody there with any capacity to threaten the borders, at least not from the east. So the problem is whether the new states of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet satellites, should be included in NATO. If we are reluctant to antagonize the Russians today when they’re weak, it is an illusion to think that somewhere three, four years down the road, we can suddenly move in that direction when they’re stronger. Nor am I saying that we should treat the Russians as enemies. What I’m saying is we should have the friendliest political relations with Russia. The President’s visit to the European Security Conference is a good symbol of this. I look at NATO as a safety net, as an insurance policy, and you don’t want to wait to take out an insurance policy when the house is already on fire.
Robert MacNeil: But you say why take out the insurance policy when there’s no threat of fire right at the moment?
Jack Matlock: Yes, it seems to me that clearly Russia could be a threat in the future. No one can deny that. Russia now is weak, disorganized, and despite the unfortunate rhetoric, which is worrisome, they don’t really have the ability to threaten.
Robert MacNeil: Which American secretaries of state and spokesmen and others continue to say is mostly for domestic consumption in Europe?
Jack Matlock: I think that is true. Nevertheless, it’s worrisome and we should respond to it. But the fact is, we would probably have close to a decade to respond to the successive steps it would take.
Henry Kissinger: Why is that?
Robert MacNeil: Spell that out for a moment.
Jack Matlock: Well, I think right now their economy is in shambles. Their army and their whole military establishment, though it has a lot of weaponry, is not really organized so that it can effectively threaten someone else. They have not been able, for the last two years, to cope with a rebellion in one of their own provinces in Chechnya, which we’ll be talking about later. It seems to me they’re simply not in a position to threaten their neighbors in a military sense. That is my contention, and it seems to me that we should make clear the sort of things which, if they should do them, we would feel compelled to take countermeasures. And I think that would be a considerable deterrent.
Robert MacNeil: Why do you disagree with that logic? Why provoke the Russians now by extending NATO closer to them, which would imply that the West thought Russia was going to become a threat?
Henry Kissinger: The first question is, why should they be provoked if we say an attack on Poland is an attack on the entire Atlantic region? I don’t see why that should provoke them, especially since we could make military arrangements. We have, for example, in Eastern Germany, military arrangements whereby no non-German troops go beyond the Elbe. We could make similar arrangements for Poland, ensuring that no non-Polish troops will be stationed on Polish territory. So then it is, so what we would be extending is a security guarantee that places Poland strictly into…
Robert MacNeil: But why would we need to do that?
Henry Kissinger: Because if we don’t do this, we will create, as I have said before, two categories of borders in Europe. We are creating a no-man’s land. And because the reluctance to do that can only indicate that we are not. So then, what we would be extending is a security guarantee that places Poland strictly into NATO’s protection?
Robert MacNeil: Let’s put up the map so everyone can follow this. You see this map. Where is the no-man’s land you are referring to?
Henry Kissinger: It would be Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. What you see in yellow on this map would be the no-man’s land, an area in which both Germany and Russia would try to exert influence. For example, Yeltsin, in his speech to the General Assembly at the UN, referred to anything east of that yellow-shaded area — that’s Belarus and Ukraine — as being connected to Russia like “blood brothers.” He implied that no outside influence was permissible there. Beyond that, Yeltsin spoke of “open spaces,” which implies a kind of neutralism. Neutralism, in this context, means that Russia has a veto over the political direction of that area. And the result in, I would fear, would be that these countries would be torn into, to make some kind of arrangements. I don’t think the Russian situation will ever become a clear-cut military threat. After all, in the middle of the middle of the world.
Robert MacNeil: Jack Matlock, what do you say to that? The idea that unless those countries in yellow are included in NATO, there will be a vacuum in which both Russia and Germany will try to assert influence?
Jack Matlock: I really don’t see that it would be more likely to happen if they are not members of NATO than if they are. We don’t feel it necessary to have countries like Austria, Switzerland, or Sweden in NATO. They remain neutral, and that doesn’t give Russia or any other country the right to dictate their policies. I think if Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary can develop stronger economies and a sense of national strength, that that’s going to be a sizable deterrent to, you might, say to Russia competing there. So far as competing for influence, there’ll be a certain competition for influence anyway. There is one of the factor here that we seem to be forgetting, and we did, though it was not a legally binding assurance, we gave categorical assurances to Gorbachev, back when the Soviet Union existed, that if a United Germany was able to stay in NATO, NATO would not be moved eastward. And, you know, I think that the current Russian government is very clear.
Robert MacNeil: So we would be, but that assurance was given to the Soviet Union.
Jack Matlock: That is right. It wasn’t a legally binding promise, but it was a geopolitical deal. And if we simply ignore it, then I, certainly if I were a Russian, it would be hard for me to interpret this, even though it may not be intended that way, and it is not, as anything less than an attempt to shut Russia off from Eastern Europe.
Robert MacNeil: And that was a line that Yeltsin used today, that it would isolate Russia and sow the seeds of discord.
Henry Kissinger: But here’s a country that has 20,000 nuclear weapons. The possibility that Poland would start marching into Russia is zero. And I repeat, this is not, in terms of political architecture, conceived as a Cold War situation because Russia can participate in the European Security Conference in all the political issues, but one has to keep in mind what a weak Russia has done in the last few months. When we were assembling forces against Iraq a few weeks ago, the Russian foreign minister appeared in Baghdad in a political demonstration that certainly in practice discouraged any American military move on Serbia. They have clearly taken traditional Russian positions, understandably so. But Russia thinks of itself as a major geopolitical player, which it has every right to do.
Robert MacNeil: Would be under what you propose, would we be extending the American nuclear umbrella eastwards to those countries if they became members, like we would guarantee that any attack on Poland might be met with a nuclear attack? Would we be stationing American troops further east? You mentioned in Poland you would give a guarantee that it would only be Polish troops, but in other countries, would you be moving American troops further east?
Henry Kissinger: This would be subject to negotiation with the Soviets, with the Russians. I’m more concerned with establishing the principle of who belongs to the Atlantic Alliance than with all the military dispositions. I see no need to station American troops in any of the former Soviet satellites. Nor is it conceivable, nor should we, stationed American nuclear weapons in any of the former satellites. And we could embody this in some sort of an arms control agreement or some other agreement with Russia. What we would do is to create a safety net that says, we hope that political conditions will evolve, as Ambassador Matlock says, in which case this is irrelevant. If they don’t, however, and we also are discouraging any historic temptations to start throwing their weight again.
Robert MacNeil: And is your point, Ambassador Matlock, that to do this might provoke those historic temptations and inflame the nationalist feelings in Russia which a Yeltsin could not ignore?
Jack Matlock: This is the problem. It’s not that you refrain from doing something because it will offend Russia. If Russia is doing something that we don’t want it to do, we should offend them. That’s not the problem, but you should need to take into account the impact in the internal politics of the other countries. And it will definitely, as things stand now, leave the impression in Russia that the West is cutting them off and moving the line closer to their border. Now, over time, we might be able to persuade them differently. During German reunification, we brought about nearly 180-degree turn on several issues through diplomacy and through some changes in our own position. So, you know, perhaps that would happen. But now the impact would be very negative in Moscow, in Russian politics, and would not be a service to those who want democratic institutions.
Robert MacNeil: Okay. I’m sorry, but I have to thank you both and leave it there for now. Appreciate you joining us.
