The Empirical Foundations of Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy of Beauty

Critics have accused Thomas Aquinas of developing an abstract, unempirical philosophy of beauty based on theological assumptions. Yet these charges collapse under scrutiny. Aquinas, following Aristotle, held that human knowledge begins with the senses and moves from the known to the unknown. Starting with divine beauty—unknowable in itself—would contradict his entire epistemology. Moreover, he consistently distinguished between philosophy and theology, insisting that the philosopher must not base conclusions on revealed truths. His reflections on divine beauty derive from observation: harmony, clarity, and proportion in creation point to their divine cause.

Aquinas’ aesthetics begins with the empirical fact that some things are beautiful. He observes that beauty delights when known and builds from this an account grounded in human perception. Beauty, unlike goodness, relates to the intellect as well as the will, and refers to formal rather than final causality. He identifies beauty with order, integrity, proportion, and clarity—all drawn from sensory experience, especially of the human body, but extended to animals and the material world. Only humans delight in beauty as such, due to their rationality, which confirms beauty’s suprasensory character.

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by Francis J. Kovach
University of Oklahoma

I. The philosophy of beauty, just as any genuine philosophy, must have some empirical basis. This is a truth recognized and stressed by numerous contemporary thinkers and aestheticians—both Scholastic¹ and non-Scholastic.² For this reason, it is gravely disturbing to the Thomistic philosopher of beauty that charges of unempirical construction and theistic apriorism are sometimes raised by aestheticians and art historians against medieval aesthetics in general,³ and against the philosophy of beauty of Thomas Aquinas in particular.⁴ To make things worse, these charges have received further support from a rather unexpected source, viz., from older and younger Neo-Scholastic or even Neo-Thomistic authors of textbooks who do things like listing categorically Thomas’ three principles of beauty with no attempt made at justifying this theory in an empirical manner,⁵ or adopting Aquinas’ theory of beauty despite openly admitted difficulties with that theory,⁶ or by remarks that, although true in themselves, tend to imply the authoritative or aprioristic character of Thomas’ philosophy of beauty.⁷

It is, therefore, quite obvious that we must investigate whether Aquinas actually proceeded from divine to creatural beauty, and whether he ignored or failed to utilize any empirical foundations in the construction of his philosophy of beauty.

II. Of the two charges listed above, the first and more specific charge will be answered in three steps, in terms of two more or less aprioristic and one aposterioristic arguments; the second and more generic charge, by listing certain empirical facts and showing how from them Thomas derived the various components of his philosophy of beauty.

A. The Charge of Theistic Apriorism

1. Thomas wholeheartedly shared Aristotle’s doctrine that, since the natural process of learning is that moving from the known to the unknown or from the better known to the less known,⁸ and since, to use, sensible things are known first⁹ and better,¹⁰ the proper process of learning moves from sensible to suprasensible things.¹¹ But to move from divine beauty, the most universal cause, to the beauty of the creature is to move the other way around.¹² Inasmuch, then, as this theory is true, the alleged theistic apriorism in question represents a generic epistemological impossibility and, even if it were possible, it would mean a grave and extended violation of one of the most fundamental and most often repeated teachings of Aquinas.

2. Thomas teaches that, although God in Himself is the most intelligible of all beings, God is not intelligible to us at all on account of the natural limitation of the human intellect,¹³ except through material beings as they are His creatures of effects, and He, their first principle and cause.¹⁴ Thomas holds furthermore that, even in this indirect way, we can easier and better understand God in a negative than in an affirmative manner;¹⁵ for we can never really grasp what God is, but only what He is not, and how other things are related to Him.¹⁶ To proceed, then, from God’s beauty as the principle of reasoning in the construction of his philosophy of beauty, as Thomas is being  charged, would be not only contrary to this philosophy of God but also a specific epistemological impossibility.¹⁷

Somebody may, perhaps, suggest here that Aquinas might have circumvented this epistemological impossibility simply by using certain data of revelation concerning divine beauty¹⁸ as principles of his philosophy of beauty. For it was he who admitted that we hold true of God many things which cannot be investigated through reason by the philosopher.¹⁹ In reply to this, we can point out the formal distinction which Thomas has drawn between reason and faith,²⁰ and philosophy and theology,²¹ to the effect that, in his opinion, the philosopher must never use revealed data as principles for his conclusions—an advice and warning that he himself followed with painstaking consistency and care.²²

3. While the two arguments heretofore discussed are aprioristic in the sense that they show that Thomas could not possibly have proceeded, as charged, from divine to creatural beauty, either at all or, at least, without contradicting himself in important matters, this third argument aims at showing that, as a matter of fact, Thomas’ theory of divine beauty is empirical in its roots.

(a) Texts containing positive characterizations of the beauty of God speak of the fact that God is beautiful, of how great His beauty is, of what it does to man, and even of what it essentially is in reference to a divine person.

In one of these texts, the fact that God is beautiful is concluded to in terms of God being the cause of the consonance and clarity to be found in all things.²³ In another text, this divine beauty is affirmed to be the greatest of all beauties on the empirical premise that every beauty is due to shape or form.²⁴ In a further passage, Thomas formally concludes from the delightful attractiveness of creatural beauty, mentioned as a commonly known fact, to the attractiveness of divine beauty. Finally, in two theological contexts, the thesis that the second divine Person has the specific character of beauty is demonstrated from the three metaphysical principles of beauty,²⁶ each one of which, as shall be shown,²⁷ is empirically known.

(b) Thomas’ negative characterization of divine Beauty is, if possible, even more obviously of empirical foundations since he keeps on stressing this fact.

This characterization begins with the statement that the beauty of God is excessive in two ways, viz., as being most beautiful and “super-beautiful,” although “these two excesses do not go together in the created things.”²⁸ Next, Aquinas turns to explaining the term “most beautiful” (pulcherrimus), as it refers to God, in terms of lack or absence of any defect that one usually finds in the beauties of created things, namely, changeableness and limitation. For unlike the corruptible things, God is always and in the same manner beautiful, without generation or corruption, increase or decrease. Similarly, God is not beautiful in one part or at one time or in relation to one thing or in one place, while being non-beautiful in another part or at another time or in relation to another thing or in another place, although all this is commonly known to be true of particular things in this world.²⁹

B. The Charge of Non-Empirical Construction

1. The most basic empirical fact concerning beauty is this, that there are beautiful things in our world. Now, there are numerous texts to be found in the writings of Thomas which show us that he was fully aware of this most fundamental of all facts about beauty.³⁰ As a consequence of this realization, his philosophy of beauty is epistemologically realistic and metaphysically objectivistic. The clearest expression of this is the following remark: “Things are not beautiful because we love them; instead, we love things because they are beautiful.”³¹

2. Having empirically recognized the objective reality of beauty in material things, the next question to everybody’s mind is this, “What is beauty?” Thomas is often quoted as having defined beauty as being “that which delights when (or upon becoming) known.”³² This may sound to some like an arbitrary postulate or authoritative doctrine on his part. However, the chronologically first text dealing with this question reads rather, “Those things are said to be beautiful which delight when known.”³³ This text leaves no doubt about the fact that Thomas came to this basic characterization or definition by effect of beauty precisely by observation, that is, empirically, rather than by aprioristic postulation.³⁴

On the other hand, once he had found this explanation of what beauty is in terms of what it does to the observer, Thomas used this initial knowledge as the point of departure of his entire philosophy of beauty and, more specifically, of a number of psychological and metaphysical questions concerning beauty.

(a) The psychological use of this initial definition is accomplished by adding to this primordial observation of the nature of beauty a well-known psychological principle, namely, that everything, hence, also the senses, take delight only in objects proportionate to them,³⁵ and by concluding thereby to due proportion as the subjective and relational nature of beauty.³⁶

(b) A highly speculative metaphysical use of the same initial definition consists in Thomas’ doctrine that, although the good and the beautiful are really identical,³⁷ they do differ virtually (ratione).³⁸ As a proof of this, Aquinas cites two observable facts: one, that the good is that which simply delights the appetite; and two, that, as a matter of fact, those things are called beautiful which delight when known.³⁹ From all this, in turn, Thomas deduces the following additional doctrines:

(1) While the good has a reference only to the will, the beautiful has a reference to the intellect as well as the will; and

(2) While the good belongs in the order of final causality, the beautiful properly pertains to the order of formal causality.⁴⁰

This bold and unerring reasoning from empirical facts (of what we call beautiful) through epistemology (knowledge is assimilation of form) to metaphysics (the formal causality of beauty and its virtual distinction from goodness) leads Thomas ultimately to his metaphysical doctrines concerning the relation of beauty to goodness⁴¹ and the transcendentality of beauty.⁴²

3. A further empirical fact which Thomas observed and utilized is this: that we call mainly or mostly visible and audible objects beautiful.⁴³ In this connection, Thomas is not satisfied with the realization of how well this additional fact harmonizes with his empirically deduced doctrine of the formal relation that beauty has to the intellect, and also with his Aristotelian theory of the senses of vision and hearing as the most cognitive senses.⁴⁴ Instead, he uses this observed fact in working out his partly psychological, partly epistemological theory of aesthetic experience. According to this theory, vision and hearing are the principal sources and indispensable conditions of aesthetic experience;⁴⁵ intuitive cognition and disinterested delight, its essence;⁴⁶ and habitual knowledge and love (desire) of beauty, its effects.⁴⁷

4. A fourth empirical fact which Thomas observed is that no irrational animal takes delight in beauty as beauty. Adding this to the above-mentioned fact that cognitively delightful things, and especially those that are visible and audible, are called beautiful, Thomas could immediately conclude that, of all animals, only man takes delight in beauty as beauty.⁴⁸ In the light of his psychology, according to which man is a rational animal, it was easy for him to see the reason for this aesthetic truth in the relative, epistemological property of beauty, called suprasensory cognoscibility. However, since the knowability of a thing depends not only on the nature of the knower but also on the nature of the thing known, there was also clearly a need, in addition to this psychologico-epistemological explanation, for an objective, metaphysical explanation for this property of suprasensory cognoscibility of beauty. Thomas furnishes this explanation through an objective, essential definition of beauty. For he defined beauty synthetically as being order⁴⁹ and analytically, as being that which requires integrity, proportion, and clarity;⁵⁰ and all of these principles of beauty, especially order⁵¹ and proportion,⁵² are quite obviously only suprasensorily cognoscible.

5. How did Thomas arrive at these definitions of beauty?⁵³ In the light of what has already been said, the answer is anything but surprising: all three analytic principles of beauty, namely integrity,⁵⁴ proportion,⁵⁵ and clarity,⁵⁶ as well as the synthetic definition of beauty as order,⁵⁷ are based on empirical facts which Thomas explicitly mentions. In one passage he even speaks of careful observations as the necessary starting point in our thinking, leading our minds to essential definitions of health and beauty.⁵⁸

Were the empirical facts which Aquinas observed and mentioned sufficiently broad as to deduce from them any metaphysical definition of beauty? One must admit that the great majority of the texts containing empirical references speak of the beauty of the human body only. However, some texts show that Thomas considered in his aesthetic speculations the beauty of things other than the human body, too, such as animal body in general and material being in general.⁵⁹ Thereby, he could rightly become convinced that his essential definitions do have empirically broad enough foundations as to be universally valid.

III. Summing up, it can truthfully be asserted that not one of the charges raised against Thomas’ philosophy of beauty are justified: neither the specific charge of theistic apriorism nor the more generic charge of a lack of empirical foundations. These charges are, thus, due either to insufficient familiarity with Thomas’ philosophy or to misunderstandings.

On the other hand, those who sufficiently know and properly understand Thomas’ thought will, irrespective of their philosophic or aesthetic views, gladly concede the continued influence even upon present-day aesthetic speculations⁶⁰ of this empirically well-founded and logically well-constructed medieval aesthetic theory.

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NOTES

1 “We might begin our study of the beautiful with a metaphysical definition of it, but to do so would lay us open to the suspicion of starting from a priori concepts. Instead, then, let us begin with observation. . .” (J. Card. Mercier, A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, Vol. I. General Metaphysics. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner; St. Louis, Mo. Herder, 1932, p. 504.) “The philosophy of art ought to follow the inductive method; it ought to rise from observation to principles and laws… Observation of artistic facts is the point of departure requisite for a study of beauty.” (Maurice De Wulf, Art and Beauty. Tr. by Sr. Mary Gonzaga Udell, O.P. St. Louis, Herder, 1950, p. 14f.) See also Leonard Callahan, A Theory of Esthetic according to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas (The Catholic University of America Press. Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 16.

2 Louis Arnauld Reid, for example, writes, “A constant danger of art philosophy is a too independent analytic speculation which has flown away from the original datum of living aesthetic experience.” (“A Reply to Mr. Morris-Jones,” i.e., to Morris-Jones’ review of L.A. Reid’s Ways of Knowledge and Experience, published in The British Journal of Aesthetics, I. No. 4, published ibid., II, No. 1. January, 1962, p. 67.)

3 Having called the aesthetic philosophy of the Middle Ages a “postulate,” B. Bosanquet goes on to say, “But… from the total absence… of theoretical study directed to the concrete analysis of austere or recondite beauty in nature or in art, we shall infer that for medieval theory the beauty of the universe was rather an abstraction…” (A History of Aesthetic. Meridian Books 36. Third Printing. Cleveland and New York, The World Publishing Co., 1961, p. 149) “The most obvious change, when we come to Addison, and the other Britishers, are the abandonment of the metaphysical approach von Oben herab and the introduction of the psychological, introspective approach.” (Jerome Stolnitz, “On the Origins of ‘Aesthetic Disinterestedness,’” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XX/2. Winter, 1961, p. 139.) Cf. also D. M. Robb, J. J. Garrison, Art in the Western World. Third edition. New York, Harper and Row, 1953, p. 172.

4 The charge of unempirical apriorism has been expressed, among others, by B. Croce bluntly asserting that Thomas simply posited three requisites (ponere tria requisiti) for beauty (Aesthetic. Tr. D. Ainslie. New York, Macmillan, 1922, p. 176). For the Italian quotation, see the Bari: G. Laterza, 1958 edition, p. 192); and, somewhat more moderately but more generally, by Harold Osborne: “The (aesthetic) theory of St. Thomas is difficult to understand because… it does not seem to be based on more than a superficial understanding of aesthetic experience.” (Aesthetics and Criticism. New York, Philosophical Library, 1955, p. 208.) For the charge of theistic apriorism, see, for instance, Gilbert-Kuhn (“The harmony that pleases human beings in nature and in artificial objects is not really, so it was said, an attribute to these things as independent entities, but a reflection into them of their divine origin.” A History of Esthetics. Revised edition. London, Thames and Hudson, 1956, p. 130), and Thomas Munro’s highly interesting account (Toward Science in Aesthetics, New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956, p. 268f.). Closely connected with these two charges is the often mentioned assertion that, instead of any empirical basis, Thomas used the authority and doctrines of Aristotle without or with Plato (e.g., Frank P. Chambers [Cycles of Taste. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1928, p. 115] and Gilbert-Kuhn, op. cit., p. 120); of Augustine (Gilbert-Kuhn, op. cit., p. 140); or Pseudo-Dionysius (Croce, ibid.).

5 Cf., for instance, Michael De Maria (Philosophia Peripatetico-Scholastica, I: Philosophia prima seu Ontologia. Third edition. Rome, Ph. Cuggiano, 1904, p. 397f.), Karl Frick (Ontologia. Sixth edition. Friburgi Brisgoviae, Herder, 1929, p. 235), Michael W. Shallo (Lessons in Scholastic Philosophy, Philadelphia, P. Reilly, 1929, p. 202), and John Rickaby (General Metaphysics, Stonyhurst Philosophical Series, Third edition. London-Toronto, Longmans, Green, 1930. Book I, p. 149f.).

6 J. J. Urráburn, for instance, declares, “Solaque me tenet S. Thomae auctoritas, ne penitus eidem (sc. difficultati) succumbam.” [(Institutiones Philosophicae, II: Ontologia. Vallissoletti, Lutteiae Parisiensis et Romae, 1891, p. 535)]; L. De Raeymaeker admits of Thomas’ metaphysical definition of beauty, “Quomodo praestari debet in concreto, non est facile dictu” (Metaphysica generalis, I. Bovanij, 1933, p. 89); and É. Gilson advises us concerning claritas, the third analytic principle of beauty in Aquinas, “Since this is given to us (sc. by Thomas) as a fact, the wise thing to do is to accept it as such.” (The Elements of Christian Philosophy, New York, The New American Library, 1963, p. 178).

7 Statements to the effect that Thomas listed certain requirements of beauty given without any further information about how or why Thomas did so, suggest or tend to suggest an authoritative, unproved, dogmatic treatment or arbitrarism on Thomas’ part, and lead inevitably to accusations like N.T. Noon’s that: the doctrine of the transcendentality of beauty is “Aquinas’ categorical assumption.” (Joyce and Aquinas, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1957, p. 24.)

8 Aristotle, Phys. I, 1, 184 a 16–18; De an. II, 2, 413 a 11; Thomas, Comm. L. 1. n. 7 and 6; In I. Post. an. 4. n. 43bis; In II. De an., L. 3. n. 245.

9 Thomas, In I. Phys. L. 1. n. 7; In I. Post. an. L. 8. n. 71; L. 4. n. 43; L. 42. n. 372; De ver. I, 11.

10 Aristotle, Met. I, 2, 982 a 23–24; Thomas, Comm. L. 2 n. 45; In I. Post. an. L. 4. n. 42f; ST II–II 172.

11 Aristotle, Post. an. II, 19, 100 a 3–14; Met. I, 1, 980 a 28–981 a 12; Thomas, In II. Post. an. L. 20. n. 592; In I. Met. L. 1. nn. 10–17; also, In I. Post. an. L. 42, n. 378; and L. 30. n. 251.

12 Cf. the idea of God as causa universalissima; Scg. II, 15; ST II–II, 172, 3. De pot. 7, 2; In I. Met. L. 2. n. 46 and In IV. Met. L. 6. n. 599.

13 ST II–II, 24, 2, ad 2; I, 12, 1, ad 2.

14 ST I, 13, 1c and ad 2; 86, 2, ad 1; 13, 2c and ad 3; 13, 4c; I–II, 93, 2, ad 1.

15 ST I, 13, 1; 84, 7, ad 3; Scg. I, 14, 117.

16 Scg. I, 30, 278. Cf., ST I, 1, 9, ad 3.

17 De divinis et intelligibilibus rebus loqui non possumus nisi secundum modum rerum sensibilium, a quibus cognitionem accipimus (ST I, 41, 1, ad 2).

18 Such are the following: God is beautiful (Ps. 92, 1; 95, 6; Isa. 35, 2); God’s beauty is supreme (Wisd. 13, 3); God is the efficient cause of the beauty of every creature (Wisd. 13, 3; Ecclu. 42, 21; 43, 1), including man (Jud. 10, 4; Ps. 29, 8; Ezech. 31, 9); and, therefore, the beauty of the creature mirrors God’s own beauty (Wisd. 13, 5); etc.

19 ST II–II, 1, 8, ad 1.

20 ST I, 2, 2, ad 1; 12, 13, ad 3; and I–II, 67, 3. Cf. ST II–II 174, 2, ad 3.

21 ST I, 1, 1, ad 2. Cf., ibid., 1c and Scg. II, 4.

22 Cf., for example, his philosophic position on the question of the eternity or temporality of the world: De pot. 3, 14, in opp., ad 8; ST I, 46, 2.

23 Deus dicitur pulcher sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa. (ST II–II, 145, 2) Cf., De div. nom., 4, 5, 339 and 349.

24 In Ps. 26, 3. Cf., De div. nom., 4, 5, 341 and 343.

25 Scg. II, 2, 861.

26 In I. Sent. 31, 2, 1, sol; ST I, 39, 8.

27 See the texts in nn. 54–57 below.

28 De div. nom. 4, 5, 343. Cf. ibid. n. 337.

29 In this lengthy passage of the Dionysius Commentary (4, 5, 345, similar to ibid., n. 346), one finds the following empirical references: sicut de rebus corruptibilibus apparet, sicut in rebus corporalibus apparet; sicut in rebus particularibus contingit quandoque; sicut contingit in his, quorum pulchritudo cadit sub tempore; sicut contingit in omnibus quae sunt determinata ad unum determinatum usum vel finem; and, quod quidem in aliquibus contingit.

30 Such texts are those stating any one of the following:
(1) Things possess beauty. (E.g., In ev. Ioan. 2:1, L. 2; In Is. 35)
(2) Things do something or have something through their beauty. (E.g., De ver. 26, 6; In Iob, c. 28, L. 2)
(3) Some things happen to the beauty of things. (E.g., In Ps. 25, 5; In IV. Sent. 16, 2, 2, IV, ad 1; ST II–II, 142, 2, 1a)
(4) The beauty of a thing does something or causes something. (E.g., ST III, 6, 1, ad 3; Quodlib., X, 2, 1, ad 3; In IX. Eth. L. 14, n. 1944).
  For the full treatment of this question, see this author’s Die Aesthetik des Thomas von Aquin (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1961), pp. 87–93.

31 Non enim ideo aliquid est pulchrum quia nos illud amamus, sed quia est pulchrum et bonum, ideo amatur a nobis. (De div. nom., 4, 10, 439). This statement, as it stands, has undoubtedly been inspired by St. Augustine (De ver. rel., 32, 59. PL 34, 148) and Boethius (De cons. phil., II, 5, 134. PL 63, 692 A–693 A).

32 E.g., J. Maritain, Art and Scholasticism. (Tr. by Joseph W. Evans. New York, C. Scribner’s Sons, 1962.) p. 23; also, ibid., p. 163 and Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (Cleveland and New York, The World Publishing Co., 1953); H. J. Koren An Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics (St. Louis, Herder, 1955), p. 96; E. Gilson, Painting and Reality (Meridian Books 79. 2nd Printing, Cleveland and New York, The World Publishing Co., 1962), p. 175; H. Osborne (op. cit., p. 111); Th. Munro (op. cit., p. 268); Gilbert-Kuhn (op. cit., p. 140); etc. Somewhat closer to the original text is the type of quotation that uses the plural form, such as A. B. Wolter’s (Secundum S. Thomam ‘pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent’ in Summula Metaphysica [Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958] p. 156) and C. N. Bittle’s (The Domain of Being, [Milwaukee: Bruce, 1939] p. 217).

33 Pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent (ST I, 5, 4, ad 1).

34 For this reason, the best way of characterizing this statement by Thomas on beauty in the Summa theologiae (I, 5, 4, ad 1) is to call it a statement of a fundamental fact concerning beauty, as P. F. Thomas M. Zigliara (Summa Philosophica, I, Logica et Ontologia. Ed. altera. Lyon: Ve Briday, 1877. P. 409), P. Coffey (Ontologia, New York, P. Smith, 1938, p. 192), and G. B. Phelan (“The Concept of Beauty in St. Thomas Aquinas”; Aspects of the New Scholastic Philosophy. Ed. by C. A. Hart. New York, Benziger Brothers, 1932: Essays Philosophical, 7, p. 140) do it.

35 ST II–II 45, 3; I 5, 4, ad 1; De ver. 25, 1.

36 Pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent, unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit. (ST I 5, 4, ad 1.)

37 This contention is itself empirically founded: bonum et pulchrum sunt idem, quia omnia desiderant pulchrum et bonum. (De div. nom. 4, 5, 355) Omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile (ST I–II 26, 1, ad 3; II–II 145, 2, ad 1).

38 ST I, 5, 4, ad 1; I–II 27, 1, ad 3.

39 ST I–II 27, 1, ad 3; I 5, 4, ad 1. — For the empirical character of the former truth, see ST I–II 8, 1, sed contra and, 28, 6, sed contra.

40 De div. nom. 4, 5, 356; ST I 5, 4, ad 1; I–II 27, 1, ad 3.

41 Delightfulness or goodness is the matter of “genus” of beauty; cognoscibility or clarity, its form or “difference.” See, De ver. 22, 1, ad 12; De div. nom. 4, 5, 356, and ST I–II, 27, 1, ad 3.

42 De div. nom. 4, 22, 590. Also, compare ibid., 1, 2, 59 with ibid., 4, 5, 337, 355, and 11, 4, 938. For the arguments of Thomas holding the transcendentality of beauty, see this author’s op. cit., pp. 183–93, and 200–14 as well as his article, “The Transcendentality of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas” (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, II: Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, Ihr Ursprung und Ihre Bedeutung. Berlin, W. De Gruyter, 1963), pp. 386–92.

43 Dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. (ST I–II 27, 1, ad 3. Cf. In X. Eth. L. 6. n. 2028.)

44 For the former doctrine, see ST I, 5, 4, ad 1; for the latter, ST I–II 27, 1, ad 3 and In Ps. 44:2.

45 In Ps. 44:2; ST I–II 27, 2.

46 Comp. theol. p. I. tr. 1. c. 165; Contra impugn. Dei cult. et relig., p. II. c. 6. n. 339

47 In IX. Eth. L. 14. n. 1944; L. 5. n. 1824; and De div. nom. 4, 9, 402.

48 ST I 91, 3, ad 3.

49 In II. Sent. 9, 1, 5, sed contra 2a; Scg III 71, 2473; 72, 2842; 139, 3142; ST I–II 49, 4c; II–II 142, 2c; 145, 3c; 183, 2c; Comp. theol. p. I. tr. 1. c. 102. n. 201.

50 ST I 39, 8c; In I. Sent. 31, 2, 1, sol; and, for the principle of proportion, also In I. Sent. 3, 2, exp. prim., part. text.; De div. nom. 4, 5, 339; 349; 4, 6, 361; In I. Tim. 3:2 2, L. 1; ST II–II 141, 2, ad 3; 145, 2c; 180, 2, ad 3.

51 Scg II, 24, 1006; De carit., art. 9. 2a.

52 ST II–II 58, 4c; In I. Eth. L. 1. n. 1.

53 For this brief portion of the present paper, see this author’s “The Role of Nature in the Aesthetics of St. Thomas Aquinas”, La filosofia della natura nel Medioevo, Atti del III Congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale, 1964 (Milano, Soc. editrice vitae pensievo), pp. 502–508.

54 Nec indicatur homo pulcher, nisi omnia eius membra fuerint decora; turpis autem iudicatur etiam si unum eius membrum fuerit deforme. (De malo 2, 4, ad 2.) See also De malo 8, 4; De regno I, 3 art. 9, ad 16. A complementary observation is to be found in De virt. cardin., art. 2, 12a.

55 In corpore (humano) pulchritudo dicitur ex debita proportione membrorum (In I. Cor. II; 4, L. 2), Sed pulchritudo non contingit nisi omnia membra sint bene proportionata et colorata (In II. Eth. L. 7. n. 320) Cf. also In Psalm. 44:2; Scg II, 64, 1424; and In I. Sent. 31, 2, 1. sol.

56 Pulchritudo dicitur ex debita proportione membrorum in convenienti claritate vel colore (In I. Cor. 11:4, L. 2.) Cf. also In I. Sent. 31, 2, 1. sol; In II. Eth. L. 7. n. 320 and ST I 39, 8c.

57 Patet autem quod… quanto est maior inordinatio in membris, tanto est maior turpitudo. (Scg III, 139, 3142) Non enim est pulchritudo in corpore, nisi omnia membra fuerint decenter disposita; turpitudo autem contingit, quodcumque membrum indecenter se habeat. (De regno I, 3.) See also De malo 8, 4c, and ST I–II 54, 1c.

58 Sed si quis diligenter inspiciat… (Scg III, 139, 3142).

59 Non dicitur animal sanum simpliciter aut pulchrum, nisi secundum omnes partes suas sit tale (ST I–II 52, 2c). Ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur; primo quidem integritas, sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. (ST I 39, 8c.)

60 Historians of aesthetics, openly speaking of the richness and depth of Thomas’ philosophy of beauty whereby it is quite capable of influencing others, include William Knight (“Whatever we make of his [sc. Thomas’] theory, we may agree with P. Vallet that he opens up to us ‘immense horizons’ of thought.” The Philosophy of the Beautiful, I. London: J. Murray, 1903. P. 45. Cf. also p. 136); H. D. Aikin (“The Thomistic definition of beauty might lead to genuinely fruitful reflection upon the empirically observable facts of art and appreciation.” Book review, Journal of Philosophy [August 26, 1948] p. 499); Thomas Munro (“One can disagree with the basic principles of a St. Thomas, a Hegel, … and yet find much to admire and accept in their incidental observations and comments by the way.” Op. cit., p. 112); and Israel Knox (“That is the immensely vital and profound meaning of … St. Thomas’s conception of integrity in a work of art.” The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, London, Thames and Hudson, 1958, p. 46). Other historians speak of the actual influence of Aquinas’ aesthetic philosophy, among them James L. Jarrett. (“[Thomas’] perceptive remarks on beauty are still deeply influential.” The Quest for Beauty, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall, 1957, p. 10.) Some aestheticians or philosophers of beauty explicitly admit their indebtedness to Thomas’ aesthetics, such as James Joyce (A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 1916) and É. Gilson (The Arts of the Beautiful. New York, C. Scribner’s Sons, 1965, p. 173. For Thomas’ influence on him, see also, ibid., pp. 169, 177; Painting and Reality, ed. cit., pp. 52, 56, 271, 300, 324–26, and 358). Other quite modern or contemporary aestheticians may not explicitly acknowledge Thomas’ influence upon their doctrines; yet, this influence is quite obvious in their works. Such are J. Ruskin and H. Tain (see on this S. C. Pepper, The Basis of Criticism in the Arts. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 98); J. Maritain (Art et Scolastique [Third and final edition of 1935; New York; Pantheon Books, 1953]), and The Responsibility of the Artist [New York, Scribner, 1960]); Eric Gill (Beauty Looks After Herself, London, Sheed and Ward, 1933); E. I. Watkin (A Philosophy of Form, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1935); Thomas Gilby (Poetic Experience, London, Sheed and Ward, 1934); Mortimer J. Adler (Art and Prudence [New York, Longman and Green, 1937]; and Poetry and Politics [Pittsburgh, Pa., Duquesne University Press, 1965]); Robert M. Ogden (The Psychology of Art, New York, Scribner, 1938, p. 26); Herbert E. Cory (The Significance of Beauty in Nature and Art, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1947); Paul J. Marcotte (The God Within, Ottawa, The Runge Press, 1964); etc. All this seems to support Morris Weitz terming Neo-Thomist aesthetics as one of “two extremely powerful philosophical movements” in contemporary thought. (Philosophy of the Arts, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 291.)

SOURCE: The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter, 1971), pp. 93-102