The recent discussion about Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles, allegedly with U.S. “permission,” has often been misunderstood. It’s not so much about permission to strike Russian territory, already under attack for some time, but rather about NATO’s direct involvement, as using these missiles requires their GPS technology and personnel on the ground. Putin reiterated that this crosses a red line, marking NATO’s direct participation in the conflict. The ongoing provocations aim to weaken the Russian regime, but so far, they haven’t achieved the West’s desired results, and the situation on the front appears to be turning in Russia’s favor.
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di Andrea Zhok
In recent days, there has been much discussion about the “permission” given by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to use ATACMS missiles on Russian territory. However, the news is often incorrectly reported, as if the issue were about permission to strike Russian territory. Obviously, if that were the issue, it would be a non-news item, as Russian territory has been regularly hit for over a year, especially with drones.
To understand the significance of the news, one needs to look at Putin’s recent comments, in which he reminded us that, unlike drones, using high-precision ATACMS missiles (weighing 1,320 kg with a range of up to 300 km) requires NATO’s GPS targeting systems and NATO personnel on the ground. Once again, Putin stated that this is a red line, marking direct NATO involvement in the war.
Now, it is appropriate to take a moment to reflect on the issue of “red lines.”
Many armchair strategists in Rome have mocked Putin’s threats over the past year and the fact that he has never responded with his full potential to the continual crossing of these “red lines.” This lack of response is presented as a sign of weakness on Putin’s part.
It is worth remembering that the topic of “red lines” not to be crossed is precisely what led to the so-called “Special Operation,” that is, the ongoing war. The war stems from NATO’s repeated challenges to these “red lines,” first regarding NATO’s non-expansion eastward and then Ukraine’s non-neutrality.
In fact, the best way to understand the current conflict is to see it as a continual challenge to Russia—a permanent provocation whose primary purpose is to reaffirm the subjugation experienced during the Yeltsin years, undermining any Russian claim to return as a global player.
Each red line crossed without reaction is seen and presented as a sign of the regime’s weakness, portraying it as a paper tiger. And this game has real consequences within Russia itself, where the core issue is the ability to exist as the enormous multi-ethnic country it is. Any sign of weakness in central power (this has been true since the days of the Tsarist Empire) opens the door to potential centrifugal movements within the country.
From the 2014 coup to the oppression of Russian-speaking minorities in Donbass, to the refusal to maintain Ukrainian neutrality, and the series of military “red lines” violated during the war, the entire process can be seen through the lens of provocation.
But what is the meaning of these provocations? As mentioned earlier, they are actions aimed at signaling the regime’s weakness, thereby inviting internal challenges to central power (Prigozhin’s rebellion being an example).
In the early stages, this process did not lead to the desired outcomes for the West (i.e., the U.S.). The idea was clear: once Putin took the bait and invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainian military—trained to NATO standards over the past eight years—would demonstrate that Russia is a paper tiger. Western economic sanctions would strangle the Russian economy, and the gap between military and economic failure would put the regime in a corner, leading to internal uprisings and systemic collapse.
As we know, this scenario did not materialize.
On the military front, the operation has become entrenched in a war of position and attrition. On the economic front, thanks mainly to China’s support, Russia managed to absorb the initial shock and found a new framework for exporting raw materials. Once it got through that first difficult phase, Russia entered a new stage, untethered from its old agreements with Europe and reoriented towards the Asian market.
Now, the military situation in Ukraine is critical for Western forces. The Kursk venture, involving the invasion of Russian territory, was yet another red line crossed, whose sole purpose was to damage the regime’s image, being militarily senseless.
In the central area of the front, the Russian army has now reached the third and final defensive line, beyond which there are no more fortified lines. Ukraine’s collapse seems a matter of months, likely to happen by next spring.
In light of this scenario, the entire Western leadership—namely, the American military-industrial complex and its European apprentices—seems to have no Plan B. This appears paradoxical because international politics, as it has always been, is made up of Plans B, C, and D; it’s made up of tactical and strategic alternatives. But this situation is different because here, those in charge and those at risk are different parties.
Those in charge, the U.S., can afford to violate any red line with impunity: they know that Putin is not a madman bent on global destruction and therefore will not launch a direct attack on U.S. soil.
Those who follow orders, Europe, have already devastated their own production system and are on the front lines to suffer targeted attacks, even nuclear ones (it is worth remembering that in today’s military doctrine, the use of tactical nuclear weapons counts as conventional warfare and not the start of a nuclear war).
Essentially, the U.S. pushes for the violation of all red lines because they have two powerful, sacrificial “buffer zones”: first, Ukraine, already doomed, and then Europe.
The moment Putin decides to finally respond to the threats posed by the violation of yet another red line, deploying his nuclear superiority, he could once again be presented as an existential threat that cannot be negotiated with.
And should NATO territory be involved, Article 5 of the Alliance could be triggered, leading to direct war, with Europe as the frontline. As I used to remind those who gleefully celebrated being under NATO’s protective umbrella, the reality is that we are not UNDER NATO’s umbrella—we ARE the umbrella, the first to be hit by the rain.
So, here we are on the eve of yet another red line violation. Our only hope is that, once again, NATO’s Wunderwaffen won’t be able to cause too much damage, allowing Putin to keep a low profile and contain the internal pressures from the “hawks.”
If, on the contrary, the ATACMS manage to inflict significant damage, swaying Russian public opinion, we cannot harbor illusions about what the next step will be.
