The article argues that Ukraine’s recent military actions, far from being independent offensives, are attempts to involve the West more deeply in the conflict against Russia. With limited manpower but significant Western military support, Kyiv seeks to maintain visibility and pressure its allies into greater involvement. The piece draws parallels between Ukraine’s tactics and historical military strategies, noting the high costs and limited success of such maneuvers. Ultimately, it warns that Ukraine risks losing its sovereignty as it increasingly relies on external support.
* * *
by Fabio Mini
Raid, counteroffensive, offensive: the news from Ukraine oscillates between these terms, deliberately exaggerating a phase of the ground combat which, like every other action taken by Kyiv in the past year, is in fact a foreign-directed and foreign-led initiative to entangle the West in a long and bloody war.
Obviously, the Americans are careful not to describe the current Ukrainian incursion into Russia as an offensive. Technically, it is not, given the level of forces involved, and it should not be labeled as such to avoid portraying Ukraine as an invader instead of an invaded country.
Europe and NATO overextend themselves, even losing their balance, when they claim that the offensive on Russian territory is a defensive right. Our defense minister seems to be the only one who understands the difference between offense and defense, and perhaps also the difference between a people’s right to self-defense and a violation of international law through proxy war.
The Costly Raids and Their Limited Impact
The United States also refrains from attributing any strategic significance to the ongoing operations. In fact, like other pseudo-offensives, these raids are costly for Kyiv in terms of men and weapon systems and yield little in terms of military or political advantage. Instead, they worsen the situation, as evidenced by the Russian reactions and President Zelensky’s repeated response to every aid package of missiles, planes, artillery, and ammunition: “It’s not enough.” The vulnerabilities exposed by the raids highlight Russia’s struggles to “contain” the attacks and the discomfort of its border populations.
The notion that there was a sealed, inviolable border between Russia and Ukraine, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, has always been a fabrication. All of Europe is at war with Russia, and along the borders, there have always been areas of low or no concentration of Russian defense forces, as well as numerous zones where military movements from both sides were possible along minor routes. The so-called strategic objectives of these raids are more of an unnecessary risk than a benefit.
A sabotage or action against the Kursk nuclear power plant could provoke a very serious response, whether it is labeled a terrorist act or considered an act of war. And Ukraine is well aware of this.
Yet, something different, though not new, is emerging. Tactically, Ukrainian actions seem to echo the desert warfare tactics of Rommel (1941 – North Africa), where in each battle, deep objectives were captured but 90% of the forces (including Italian ones) were lost. This tactic worked for a few months and then led to defeat due to the lack of reinforcements in men and materials and the mass intervention of the Anglo-Americans.
Ukrainian actions also bring to mind operations that the U.S. forces envisaged at the end of the Cold War (1980s-90s), employing small mechanized and armored infantry units in difficult contexts.
In 2003, some American scholars (Richard Van Atta, Kent Carson, and Waldo Freeman) revisited this idea as Small Units Precision Combat (Supc) on an intercontinental level. The Supc relied on a combined force of space control, local air control, deployment of small infantry units, including armored ones by air, land, and/or sea, intelligence cover, and electronic warfare.
The Supc were never executed in open combat but were used in some anti-terrorism operations. On the other hand, the same technique, though without the same resources, was used by terrorist organizations, as in the case of Mumbai-Lahore.
Ukraine is in a position where it lacks sufficient men and means for a large-scale offensive, but it has space support, local air cover, weapons, and equipment provided by the United States, NATO, the European Union, and other countries, contractors, and pseudo-volunteers paid or supplied by the West. It can exploit the “gaps” between deployments while avoiding the “full” areas guarded by Russian forces.
The Need to Maintain Visibility
On a strategic level, something different is happening as well. Ukraine must maintain military and political visibility to avoid being forgotten in the face of other crisis theaters like the Middle East, Africa, and even South America. It must take advantage of the uncertainty in American politics, not so much because it fears losing the promised aid, but to further involve the United States and the European Union in the conflict against Russia.
The current involvement, even on a tactical level, pushes the war even further. The raids serve to demonstrate that Russia can be attacked with weapons, that small tactics can be amplified with disinformation, and, above all, that Kyiv cannot wage war alone, not even as a proxy for the West.
Despite the United States and Europe being already deeply involved in the conflict, as evidenced by these recent raids, Kyiv wants the direct intervention of the entire West, which some countries have already promised. After two years of fighting on behalf of and for Western interests, Kyiv demands that the West fight on behalf of Ukraine.
The Price Paid by Proxies
And Kyiv has more reason to demand this, given that Israel expects and gets the same from the entire West, blinded by a war frenzy. This is not a major political-strategic novelty because Zelensky has always declared his intention to turn Ukraine into a “great Israel”: that is, armed, nuclear, and bellicose.
Ukraine has always asked for and obtained Western support and has always sought (and not fully obtained) the direct involvement of NATO or its member countries against Russia. What is new and worrying is that, unlike Israel, it is abandoning the idea of being autonomous and free to decide its own fate: of being independent and sovereign.
Proxies eventually present the bill: Ukraine has already presented it multiple times and has been paid; the West, as Ukraine’s new proxy, has not yet, and the only thing Ukraine has left to spend is its sovereignty.
Il Fatto Quotidiano, August 11, 2024
